ABSTRACT
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, several states introduced and expanded regulatory frameworks for screening (and potentially blocking) inward foreign direct investment. This shift accelerated a preexisting trend in the global political economy, as states have been widening their understanding of “national security” risks arising from foreign investment. The result is that such screening mechanisms are evolving from a niche subject to a broader regulatory tool that touches an expanding share of global economic activity. The tensions inherent in this shift—including how firms will respond, how states can evaluate systemic (rather than transactional) risk, and the potential and limits of international cooperation in investment screening—have not yet been resolved.
ABSTRACT
From the Article: Like other countries around the world, the U.S. is beginning to re-open while coronavirus transmission persists in many communities and before a vaccine has been discovered. This suggests demand for key medical goods--including medicines, coronavirus tests, ventilators, and crucial personal protective equipment (PPE) such as N95 masks--will remain high, both as precautionary measures and to respond to localized flare-ups or a possible second wave of the virus. Supply of such goods has and will continue to increase. But even with an aggressive push to increase production, supply is unlikely to be sufficient to meet the 20-fold increase in demand. During the first wave of the coronavirus outbreak, the federal government struggled to get medical goods to the people and places that needed them. It initially left distribution to market mechanisms--sparking price spirals and accusations of gouging by profiteers as state governments and hospital systems bid against one another, desperately seeking supplies. More recently, the government began blocking the export of certain medical goods, cutting off trade flows to countries in need.COVID-19 (Disease);Medical supplies